SEP 3 1965

**CPYRGHT** 

## INSIDE REPORT: Dominican Danger

By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak WASHINGTON.

Far from ending the Dominican Republic's political crisis, the installation today of a provisional regime only begins a new—and even more dangerous—phase in Santo Domingo.

The reason: The four-month-old intervention by U.S. troops, though a necessary safeguard against a possible Communist takeover, has left widespread popular antagonism against the United States.

That means Joaquin Balaguer, the leftover from Trujillo days counted on by U. S. policy makers to bring stability in Santo Domingo as a transitional figure, seems out of the question as President.

The man elected President to succeed the provisional regime will have to expound a strong brand of nationalism with pronounced anti-Yankee overtones. Joaquin Balaguer certainly does not fit that description.

Worse yet, ultra-nationalism and Yankee-baiting can fevolve rather easily into Castro communism in a country as politically primitive as the Dominican Republic. Thus, what the Communists could not achieve by force of arms in 1965 may come through the ballot box in 1966.

Although nobody talks about it publicly, these dangers are well understood at the State Department and the Organization of American States (OAS). Indeed, the new attitude here sharply contrasts with the relative optimism prevailing no more than two months ago.

At that time, U. S. policy makers believed Balaguer, President at the time of Dictator Trujillo's assassination in 1961, was the country's most popular politician—a belief confirmed by a secret CIA poll taken earlier this year. While recognizing Balaguer's less than complete devotion to democracy, U. S. officials viewed him as a transitional strongman to bridge the gap between chaos and democratic government.

All that has changed. Balaguer himself admits it privately. Since returning this summer from exile in New York to virtual house arrest in Santo Domingo, Balaguer has realized how much strength he has lost. As a result, he wants to delay elections as long as possible.

The truth is that the April revolt has picked up country-wide support and U. S. popularity has hit bottom. Nobody as far removed from the revolt and as pro-Yankee as Balaguer could be elected today.

Bracing themselves for months of anti-U. S. invective, officials here recognize the best they can hope for now is an ultra-nationalist who at least is as independent of Havana, Moscow and Peking as he is hostile to Washington. Their one consolation: The Dominican far Left has developed nobody with the popular magnetism of a Fidel Castro.

But Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, "president" of the rebels, could become another Castro. Badly underestimated by the U.S. at the start of the crisis, Caamano probably has more national popularity than any other Dominican today. What makes this so dangerous is his opportunism and adventurism.

A popular front coalition has been forming in the rebel zone with Caamano as its possible leader. One version includes the far Left, non-Communist Social Christians, the Left-of-center PRD party of ex-President Juan Bosch and the Castro-Communist 14th of June movement. If elected President at the head of such a coalition, Caamano would pose a formidable menace.

The answer is not exiling Caamano or even exiling overt Castroites, (as once was under consideration). U. S. officials realize that exiled Leftists merely get revolutionary training in Havana or Moscow and then slip back into the country. This was the case with many Leftist activists who led the April revolution.

Furthermore, the Dominican far Left will be active throughout the life of the new provisional government—first agitating for removal of U., S. and Brazilian troops and then attempting to infiltrate the provisional government. Indeed, schools in subversive techniques have been conducted inside the rebel zone.

President Johnson has pledged in private and public he will not permit another Red government in the Caribbean. Given the dangerous political mood of the Dominican Republic, that pledge may be increasingly difficult to keep in the months and years ahead.

6.1945. Naw York Hereld Tribune inc.

Approved For Release 2000/09/08: CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160065-9